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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY’S BITE OUT OF THE BIG APPLE: 
THE PROBLEM OF UNRESTRICTED EMINENT DOMAIN IN 
NEW YORK AND THE NEED FOR MORE ACTIVE COURTS 




Gurnam Singh came to the United States from India in 1981 
with his brother.
1
  Through his own hard work, determination, and 
tenacity, he created his family-operated business in Manhattanville, a 
neighborhood located in the western part of New York City’s Har-
lem.
2
  Singh and his wife own a home in Queens, two gasoline stations 
in Manhattanville, both located on West 125th Street, and they hope 
to send their daughter to medical school.
3
 
Nicholas Sprayregen is another small-business owner in the 
Manhattanville neighborhood.
4
  His properties include Tuck-it-Away 
storage facilities on Broadway, West 131st, and West 125th streets.
5
  
Sprayregen, sympathetic to the Singhs’ struggle, called the Singhs a 
“prime example of the American dream.”
6
  Unwilling to go down 
without a fight, Sprayregen proudly flew banners outside of his build-
ings which exclaimed: “Stop Columbia! We Won’t Be Pushed Out!”
7
 
What sort of a fight?  Both of these men represent a small minor-
ity of landowners in West Harlem who were willing to stand up to Co-
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, 
University of Michigan.  Thank you to Professor Paula Franzese for her invaluable 
guidance throughout the writing process.  The author would also like to thank her 
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 1 Timothy Williams, 2 Gas Stations, and a Family’s Resolve, Confront Columbia’s Ex-
pansion Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at A39. 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. 
 5 Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010). 
 6 Williams, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 7 James Barron, Self-Storage King Takes a Moment to Savor His Victory Over Columbia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009 at A14 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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lumbia University’s (“Columbia”) intrusive expansion
8
 that threat-
ened to destroy the “American dreams” of many.  Columbia Universi-
ty certainly has a strong interest in expanding its campus and devel-
oping new resources for its privately-educated students.  Most 
landowners in the project area were mere speed bumps in the 
process,
9
 but Singh and Sprayregen represent a group of people 
whose lives are forever changed because of Columbia’s uncompro-
mising desire to provide additional resources to its privileged stu-
dents.
10
  These courageous landowners expended substantial re-
sources to bring a suit, Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 
challenging their properties’ designation as “blighted” alleging that 
the stated “public use” was merely a pretext for conferring private 
benefits to Columbia.
11
  Despite their efforts, the courts undeservedly 
provided considerable deference to the legislative determinations of 
“blight” and “public use.”
12
  Columbia’s expansion illustrates the ad-
verse consequences of eminent domain and the dangerous power of 
private interests.  Courts need to play a stronger and more active role 
in eminent domain challenges, particularly in those cases in which 
the plaintiff claims that the stated public purpose is merely a pretext 
for conferring a benefit on a private entity.  To accomplish this, 
courts should demand that the local governmental organization 
demonstrate with “reasonable certainty” that the stated public bene-
fits will actually flow from a particular project; the government should 
not merely hope that the stated benefits will occur. 
Part II of this Comment explains the Columbia University plan.  
Next, Part III provides an overview of the Takings Clause and public 
use in addition to exploring the nature of pretext challenges.  Part IV 
describes the history of eminent domain jurisprudence, first detailing 
the three major Supreme Court eminent domain decisions and then 
describing the New York state court cases that led to the Kaur deci-
sion.  Part V details the various problems associated with an expansive 
view of public use.  Part VI revisits the Kaur decision in light of the ex-
isting eminent domain jurisprudence and finds that, given the courts’ 
prior treatment of pretext challenges, the result is not surprising.  Fi-
nally, Part VI also considers whether courts or legislatures are better 
equipped to determine public purpose and proposes that courts 
 
 8 See Williams, supra note 1.   
 9 Id. Williams reports that the Singhs and Sprayregen are the only two landown-
ers in the redevelopment area who refused to sell their property to Columbia.  Id.   
 10 Id.  
 11 Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010). 
 12 See id. at 730–31.   
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should require an evidentiary showing that the stated public purposes 
of the eminent domain project will actually accrue. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE COLUMBIA EXPANSION PLAN 
It is crucial to understand the complicated history of the Co-
lumbia project in order to comprehend the challenges that Singh 
and Sprayregen raised.  Columbia University’s main campus is lo-
cated in the Morningside Heights neighborhood of Manhattan, run-
ning approximately from West 113th Street to West 122nd Street, 
bounded by Morningside Drive to the east and Broadway to the 
west.
13
  Columbia’s plan will greatly expand the campus to the north 
and west; the project site extends from the south side of West 135th 
Street to the north side of West 133rd Street and is bound by Broad-
way/Old Broadway to the east and 12th Avenue to the west.
14
 
Columbia first approached the New York City Economic Devel-
opment Corporation (EDC) to redevelop the West Harlem area in 
2001, at which point the EDC performed a preliminary economic 
study of the neighborhood.
15
  The EDC issued its report in August 
2002 and set out various strategies for “economic redevelopment” of 
the area.
16
  In 2003, the EDC hired Urbitran Associates, an engineer-
ing, architecture, and planning firm, to conduct its own survey of the 
neighborhood, which, when issued by the EDC in 2004, found that 
the neighborhood merited a “blighted” designation.
17
  The study fo-
cused its analysis on four major criteria: signs of deterioration, subs-
tandard or unsanitary conditions, adequacy of infrastructure, and in-




During this time, Columbia began to purchase property located 
within the project site.
19
  Columbia approached both the Singhs and 
Sprayregen about the potential purchase of their properties.
20
  For 
the Singhs, the proposed purchase amount was far too low consider-
ing the success of their business.
21
  Sprayregen, another successful 
 
 13 See Interactive Map of Morningside Campus, COLUM. U., http://www.columbia. 
edu/about_columbia/map/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).  
 14 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724.  
 15 Id. at 725. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Barron, supra note 7; Williams, supra note 1.  
 21 Williams, supra note 1.  
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businessman, committed himself to fighting the expansion plan led 
by the belief that “eminent domain always seems to be used against 




The EDC met with Columbia and the Empire State Development 
Corporation (ESDC) in March 2004 to discuss the condemnation of 
the Singhs’ and Sprayregen’s land.
23
  Columbia hired an environmen-
tal planning and consulting firm, Alee King Rosen & Fleming 
(AKRF), to assist in obtaining approval for the project.
24
  Significantly, 
the ESDC had previously relied on AKRF’s findings of blight in the 
Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn.
25
  Around the same time, Colum-
bia agreed to pay ESDC’s costs associated with the project.
26
  In No-
vember 2007, AKRF, on Columbia’s payroll, unsurprisingly found 
that the proposed project site was blighted, and Columbia began to 
move toward obtaining the requisite agency approval from the New 
York City Planning Commission (“Planning Commission”) to carry 
out the expansion plan.
27
  The Planning Commission approved the 
rezoning that permitted Columbia to construct “a new urban cam-
pus” to be integrated with open, public space.
28
  The Planning Com-
mission also noted that the ESDC was permitted to use eminent do-
main to further the plan’s stated public benefits.
29
 
At the same time, business owners in the project area, including 
the Singhs and Sprayregen, requested documents to examine the re-
lationship between the ESDC, AKRF, and AKRF’s finding of blight.
30
  
The New York State Supreme Court’s Appellate Division ordered Co-
lumbia to hand over the documents.
31
  Due to the concerns raised 
 
 22 Robin Finn, Pushing Back as Columbia Moves to Spread out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 
2008, at B2 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 23 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 725–26. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 726 n.6 (citing Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 
166 (N.Y. 2009)).  Goldstein permitted the taking of private property for a privately 
developed land-use improvement project known as the Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn.  
Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 165.  In Goldstein, the court relied on the blight study con-
ducted by AKRF and found that even though a dispute existed between the parties as 
to whether the area truly was “substandard and insanitary” (the New York legislative 
definition of “blight”), the dispute was not a sufficient predicate for the court to sup-
plant the study’s determination.  Id. at 173.  
 26 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 726.  
 27 Id. at 727. 
 28 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29 Id.   
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.   
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about the accuracy of AKRF’s survey because of its previous work for 
the ESDC in connection with Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn, the ESDC 
conducted another survey with an independent firm, Earth Tech, 
which essentially confirmed the previous survey’s findings of blight.
32
 
On July 17, 2008, the ESDC adopted a General Project Plan that 
would enable Columbia to move forward with its plan.
33
  The ESDC 
designated the project as a “land use improvement project” and a 
“civic project” and specified the public uses, benefits, and purposes of 
the project.
34
  First, the ESDC found that the project would address 
the city and statewide need for educational, community, recreational, 
cultural, and other civic facilities.
35
  The ESDC observed that Manhat-
tanville “suffered from long-term poor maintenance, lack of devel-
opment and disinvestment” and that the project would help turn 
around these bleak conditions.
36
  Second, the ESDC determined that 
the project would create approximately 14,000 jobs during the con-
struction period in addition to 6,000 permanent jobs following com-
pletion.
37
  Third, the project would also, according to the ESDC, gen-
erate substantial revenue for the state and city.
38
  Fourth, the ESDC 
claimed that the project would also create much needed public 
space, “approximately 94,000 square feet of accessible open space 
and maintained as such in perpetuity that will be punctuated by trees, 
open vistas, paths, landscaping and street furniture and an additional 
well-lit 28,000 square feet of space of widened sidewalks that will in-
vite east-west pedestrian traffic.”
39
  Fifth, the ESDC acknowledged that 
Columbia would open a limited number of its facilities, including li-
braries and computer centers, to students attending a new public 
school to which Columbia would provide rent-free land for forty-nine 
years.
40
  In addition, Columbia also promised to open its new swim-
ming facilities to the public.
41
  Finally, the ESDC determined that the 
project would improve local infrastructure—including the 125th 
 
 32 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 727–28.  
 33 Id. at 729. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.    
 36 Id.        
 37 Id.   
 38 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729.  
 39 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 40 Id.   
 41 Id.    
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Street subway station—through a substantial investment by Columbia 
in the newly created West Harlem Piers Park.
42
 
III. OVERVIEW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: WHY CAN THE GOVERNMENT 
TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY? 
The final sentence of the Fifth Amendment, commonly called 
the Takings Clause, provides that “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”
43
  Technically, the Takings 
Clause only restricts the federal government, but its provisions have 




The Takings Clause operates whenever the government “takes” 
private property.  The Constitution authorizes the government to 
take private property only if the taking is for a public use and the 
government pays “just compensation” to the ousted landowner.
45
  On 
the surface, the Takings Clause appears to give landowners some so-
lace—it requires the government to pay the landowner compensation 
for whatever land it takes in addition to ensuring that the govern-
ment takes land for public use, rather than for private use.  Indeed, 
Justice Thomas confirmed that the Takings Clause is not a grant of 
governmental power, but rather a prohibition: “The Constitution 
does not expressly grant the Federal Government the power to take 
property for any public purpose whatsoever.  Instead, the Govern-
ment may take property only when necessary and proper to the exer-
cise of an expressly enumerated power.”
46
  As described below, a liter-
al understanding of the Takings Clause is flawed; through the phrase 
“public use,” governments have found many ways to abuse the takings 
power.
47
  Thus, Justice Thomas is perhaps better understood as ad-
monishing the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “public use.” 
Public use is a key element in the Takings Clause.  The public 
use requirement is important because, in theory, it ensures that the 
government may only compel an individual to forfeit his or her prop-
erty rights for the public’s use, not to give a benefit to another private 
person.
48
  Courts, however, have interpreted “public use” to be quite 
 
 42 Id.   
 43 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 44 See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  
 45 Carol L. Zeiner, Eminent Domain Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Private Benefit Mas-
querading as Classic Public Use, 28 VA. ENVTL L.J. 1, 8 (2010).    
 46 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 511 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
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elastic, and, on many occasions, governments have used the public 
use requirement to transfer private property from one individual to 
another private individual.
49
  Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that “public use” stands for two opposite prop-
ositions: 
[O]n the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign 
may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transfer-
ring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just com-
pensation.  On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may 
transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use 
by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.
50
 
Judicial interpretation of public use has varied in breadth over the 
past couple of centuries. 
In the 19th century, state courts, specifically New York courts,
51
 
embraced a close, narrow definition of public use that required ac-
tual “use by the public” to satisfy the test.
52
  This test, however, proved 
to be problematic to administer, as it was difficult to determine how 
much use by the public was required to qualify as public use.
53
  As in-
dustry grew rapidly and the federal courts began applying the Tak-
ings Clause to the states at the beginning of the 20th century, courts 
welcomed a more expansive definition of public use.
54
 
Through landmark public use cases like Berman v. Parker,
55
 Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
56




 49 See e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (majority opinion) (upholding the condemnation of 
private residences to allow Pfizer, a private pharmaceutical corporation, to build a 
new facility on the land).     
 50 Id. at 477. 
 51 Nineteenth century decisions in New York made clear that private property 
could not be transferred to another private individual unless the second private own-
er’s use of the land was a meaningful, clear “public” use.  See In re Niagara Falls & 
Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 N.Y. 375 (1888) (taking of private property for construction 
of a privately run sightseeing railroad not public use); In re Deansville Cemetery 
Assn., 66 N.Y. 569 (1876) (taking of private land for construction of a cemetery is not 
a public use); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (Sup. Ct. 1843) (taking of land for a private 
road not allowed).  
 52 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.  
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 480; see also Philip Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent 
Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 626–29 (1940).  Nichols argues that the narrow public 
use doctrine—“[t]o take property rights from A to transfer to B for B’s private en-
joyment is not a public use, regardless of what ultimate public purpose the transac-
tion is intended to further”—was decaying as early as the 1920s when courts began to 
uphold condemnation for slum clearance and for the building of private housing.  
Id. at 626 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 55 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  
 56 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
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Court embraced a more flexible notion of “public use” by adopting a 
“public purpose” test.
58
  Under the “public purpose” test, property 
taken for a legitimate public purpose and taken within the scope of 
the legislature’s police power satisfies the public use requirement.
59
  
The test does not include any requirement that the public actually 
use the land taken from the private landowner; it only requires that 
the taking of the land serve a general public purpose.  Included in 
this broad public purpose is the elimination of blight, a term describ-
ing the condition of neighborhoods that contain substandard hous-
ing (i.e., housing not fit for human habitation in that it is “injurious 
to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare”).
60
  At first, the de-
signation of blight was aimed at eliminating real threats to public 
safety; however, current blight designations can include intangible 
“harm,” such as economic disinvestment.
61
  Open-ended blight defini-
tions, such as that in New York, are troublesome because they provide 
ways for local governments to circumvent the public use requirement 
as it is traditionally understood.
62
  This broad public purpose defini-
tion is problematic because, as noted by Justice O’Connor, when the 
courts interpret it liberally, it affords almost no limit on the danger-
ous power of eminent domain.
63
  It rationally follows that almost any 
government taking could be designated as “blighted,” therefore serv-
ing a public purpose and thus satisfying the public use requirement 
of the Takings Clause, so long as the stated public purpose appears 
legitimate on its face. 
Like Sprayregen and the Singhs in the Kaur case, many plaintiffs 
challenge governmental takings under the concept of “pretext.”
64
  
There are a number of different types of governmental takings.
65
  
First, the sovereign may transfer private property to public ownership 




 57 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
 58 For a detailed discussion of the three cases, see infra Part IV-A.    
 59 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
 60 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.  
 61 See infra note 176 and accompanying text.  
 62 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, 
CASTLE COALITION (July 16, 2009), www.castlecoalition.org/about/component/ 
content/2412?taxk=view [hereinafter CASTLE COALITION].  
 63 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 64 See discussion infra Part IV.  
 65 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 66 Id.; see also Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 
OR. L. REV. 203, 225 (1977).  Professor Berger distinguishes between public takings 
and private takings. Id.  Similarly to Justice O’Connor’s first classification, he explains 
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This type of transfer is relatively uncontroversial.
67
  Second, the sove-
reign may transfer private property to another private party who then 
makes the property available to the general public.
68
  Examples of 
such transfers include the construction of railroads, public utilities, 
and stadiums.
69
  While still owned by a private entity, the property is 
open for use by the general public, and like the first type of transfer, 
this transfer is relatively uncontroversial.
70
  The third type of taking is 
the most controversial and occurs when the sovereign transfers pri-
vate property to another private party for that party’s private use.
71
  
This occurs often in the context of “economic revitalization” projects 
and these cases, like Kaur, typically turn on the question of whether 
the stated public purpose of the project satisfies the public use re-
quirement of the Takings Clause.
72
  Pretext challenges claim that the 
true purposes of the government taking are not the public benefits 
explicitly listed as part of the project plan but rather to bestow a ben-
efit on a more favored private party at the expense of other private 
home and business owners. 
73
  Typically in these challenges, it appears 
that the government is in fact facilitating a transfer of private land to 
another private owner while stripping the original owner of his or her 
property rights.  In the Kaur case, for example, the Singhs and 
Sprayregen challenged the ESDC findings on the grounds that the 
project only served the private interests of Columbia and not the in-
terests of the general public.
74
  As a result, Singh and Sprayregen ar-
gued that the public benefits listed as the purpose of the project were 
 
that a “public taking is one which benefits large numbers of persons in a nondiscri-
minatory and non-exclusionary manner. Takings for railroads, hospitals, streets and 
governmental buildings would clearly come within the classification.”  Id.  
 67 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 68 Id. at 498; see also Berger, supra note 66, at 225.  Professor Berger explains that 
this second type of transfer is “not normally considered to be a ‘public use’ under 
traditional eminent domain doctrine [but] would also come within the classification.  
Thus, industrial plants and even hotels (assuming they are open to all members of 
the public) would for purposes of this analysis be classified as ‘public.’”  Id.  
 69 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
 70 Id.; see also Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 
2009) (holding that a taking of private property for the building of a new sports sta-
dium, which was to be privately-owned yet open to the public, constituted sufficient 
public use).  
 71 Kelo, 545 U.S at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Berger, supra note 66, at 
226.  Professor Berger explains that “[a]s a general proposition, . . . a private taking 
is one which benefits one, or a relatively limited number of people.” Id.    
 72 Kelo, 545 U.S at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 73 Zeiner, supra note 45, at 9. 
 74 Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2010). 
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a mere pretext for the government to use the immense power of 
eminent domain to transfer their private property to Columbia. 
IV. THE PATH TO EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 
In order to fully understand the depth and strength of the pub-
lic purpose test and courts’ great deference to the legislature, one 
should review a number of key federal decisions in the past century 
that shed light on the evolution of eminent domain jurisprudence.  
Twentieth century courts endorse a broader notion of “public pur-
pose” than those in the nineteenth century did.  Particularly relevant 
is the great deference both federal and state courts give to legislative 
definitions of blight and public purpose in rendering eminent do-
main decisions. 
Before exploring the New York courts’ application of the public 
use requirement, it is necessary to first examine the United States Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause. 
A. The Big Three 
1. Berman v. Parker 
Berman was the first of the “big three” Supreme Court eminent 
domain decisions rendered during the past century.
75
  In Berman, the 
District of Columbia condemned plaintiff’s department store—
located in a blighted area—as part of a large-scale urban renewal 
program to eliminate unsafe, unsanitary, and unsightly buildings.
76
  
The District of Columbia planned to sell the land to private enter-
prises that would build privately-owned projects consistent with the 
redevelopment plan.
77
  The plaintiffs argued for an injunction, assert-
ing that the project was simply taking from one businessman “for the 
benefit of another businessman.”
78
  The plaintiffs argued that this was 
a private-owner-to-private-owner transfer, and because the project 
appeared at its heart to promote only the development of a “more at-
tractive community,” that the project did not serve any “public pur-
pose.”
79
  Unfortunately, the Court disagreed and focused its analysis 
on the purpose for the government taking, not the true identity of fu-
ture land users.
80
  The Court expanded the public purpose test and 
 
 75 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  
 76 Id. at 28. 
 77 Id. at 30.  
 78 Id. at 33.  
 79 Id. at 31.  
 80 Id. at 35–36.  
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noted that “the public end may be as well or better served through an 
agency of private enterprise than through a department of govern-
ment.”
81
  The Court concluded that it could not “say that public own-
ership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of com-
munity redevelopment projects.”
82
  The Berman Court’s acknowledg-
acknowledgment that private ownership could serve a public purpose 
demonstrates a complete abdication of the traditional public use test, 
which required actual use by the public. 
Additionally, the Court showed extreme judicial deference for 
the definition of public purpose to Congress, which retains ultimate 
authority over Washington D.C.
83
  The Court stated that “the role of 
the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised 
for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”
84
  This set the stage 
for dangerous deference to legislatures.  The Court further stated 
that “it is well within the power of the legislature to determine that 
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well 
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled . . . [and] it is not 
for us to reappraise them.”
85
  Therefore, in addition to demonstrating 
deference to the legislature, the Court noted that a “clean communi-
ty” could pass muster as a “public purpose” to satisfy the Takings 
Clause.
86
  With perhaps the most striking statement regarding defe-
rence to Congress, the Court abdicated its constitutionally-required 
role to check the power of the legislature: “Once the question of pub-
lic purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to 
be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to com-
plete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative 
branch.”
87
  Thus, Berman set the stage for Midkiff and Kelo; the 
precedent that the Berman Court established is still wreaking havoc in 
eminent domain jurisprudence fifty-eight years later. 
2. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 
Midkiff presented a different question than Berman, yet the Court 
applied the Berman precedent and declined to revise its broad inter-
 
 81 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–34.  
 82 Id.  
 83 The power that Congress has over Washington, D.C. includes all powers that a 
state may exercise over its affairs.  Id. at 31.   
 84 Id. at 32.   
 85 Id. at 33.  
 86 Id. at 33.   
 87 Id. at 35–36.  
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pretation of “public purpose.”
88
  The history of land ownership in 
Hawaii dates back to the original settlement of the islands by Polyne-
sian immigrants from the western Pacific.
89
  The early Hawaiians es-
tablished a feudal-type system of land ownership, in which the island 
high chief controlled the land and assigned it for development to 
sub-chiefs, who then re-assigned it to lower ranking chiefs, who found 
tenants.
90
  As a result, Hawaiian land had remained largely in the 
hands of a few landowners.
91
  A 1960 study conducted by the Hawaii 
legislature showed that the state and federal governments owned al-
most forty-nine percent of Hawaii’s land, and that the other forty-
seven percent of land was in the hands of only seventy-two landown-
ers.
92
  Residents could easily lease land, but it was difficult to purchase 
fee simple title to their homes.
93
 
To correct these issues, the legislature adopted a statute that 
permitted tenants living in single-family homes to petition a state 
agency, the Hawaii Housing Authority, to condemn the properties 
and then re-sell the property to the tenants in fee simple.
94
  In Midkiff, 
the plaintiff landowners sued to invalidate the statute on the grounds 
that it authorized an unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain 
power;
95




In making its determination, the Midkiff Court relied on the 
Berman decision and deferred to the legislature.
97
  Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, declared that “in short, the Court has made 
clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judg-
ment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably 
without reasonable foundation.’”
98
  The Court recognized that it plays 
a role in reviewing a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes 
public use “even when the eminent domain power is equated with the 
police power;” however, the Court noted that this role is an “‘ex-
 
 88 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 89 Id. at 232. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. 
 94 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.  
 95 Id. at 235.  
 96 Id. at 245.  
 97 Id. at 241.  
 98 Id. (citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)). 
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tremely narrow one.’”
99
  To explain its deference, the Court hig-
hlighted the legislatures’ abilities “to assess what public purposes 
should be advanced by an exercise of the takings power.”
100
  The 
Court did not seem to consider that, while the political process re-




In its deference to the legislature, the Midkiff Court established 
its “rationally related” test for determining whether or not there is in 
fact a “public purpose.”
102
  The Court affirmed that it had never held 
a compensated taking to be prohibited by the Public Use Clause 
when the exercise of eminent domain power was rationally related to 
a conceivable public purpose.
103
  The Midkiff Court conclusively estab-
lished that, when an exercise of eminent domain by the legislature is 
questioned, the appropriate question before the Court is not whether 
in fact the condemnation serves a public purpose, but whether the 
“legislature rationally could have believed that the [law] would pro-
mote its objective.”
104
  The Court further explained that even though 
the Hawaii Act authorized the use of eminent domain to force a 
transfer of private property to private beneficiaries, the transfer could 
not be condemned automatically as violating the Takings Clause.
105
  
According to the Midkiff Court, the state does not have to be the pri-
mary user of the property to legitimize the taking; “it is only the taking’s 




This “rational relationship” test affords almost no protection to 
the landowner.  Under Midkiff, most takings will have a public pur-
pose, and therefore, will be permitted.  Furthermore, it makes suc-
ceeding on a pretext challenge even more difficult because, essential-
ly, any public purpose that the legislature proffers satisfies the test, 
which requires the legislature to have only a rational belief that its 
eminent domain actions satisfy the stated purpose. 
 
 99 Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
 100 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. 
 101 Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 126; see discussion infra Part VI.B.  
 102 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. at 242 (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 
648, 671–72 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 105 Id. at 243.  
 106 Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
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3. Kelo v. City of New London 
Kelo continued expanding the definition of “public use” and 
reinforced the Court’s deference to local government determinations 
of what constitutes public purpose.
107
  New London, Connecticut—an 
economically depressed area with a high unemployment rate—
adopted a comprehensive redevelopment plan for its downtown dis-
trict.
108
  The plan was “‘projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to 
increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically-
distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.’”
109
  Ad-
ditionally, the redevelopment plan sought to make New London 
more attractive by creating leisure and recreational space on the wa-
terfront.
110
  Pfizer, the pharmaceutical giant, served as a catalyst to this 
redevelopment project by promising to build a $300 million research 
facility on the site immediately adjacent to the designated redeve-
lopment area.
111
  City officials used the redevelopment plan to pro-
vide Pfizer with a property tax break for ten years to entice Pfizer to 
build its research division headquarters in the area.
112
 
In order for the project to proceed, New London needed to ac-
quire title to the area where the redevelopment was to occur.
113
  
While many homeowners sold their homes voluntarily,
114
  Susette Kelo 
and the other petitioners refused.
115
  Kelo and her neighbors stressed 
that their homes were in excellent condition and were not by any de-
finition blighted.
116
  The Court acknowledged that there were no alle-
gations that the homeowners’ properties were blighted, but insisted 
that the properties be condemned because they were located in the 
development area.
117
  Kelo and the petitioners argued that condemn-
ing their properties would not serve the public purposes stated in the 




 107 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
 108 Id. at 473. 
 109 Id. at 472 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 
2004)).   
 110 Id. at 474.  
 111 Id. at 473. 
 112 Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City that Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2009 at A1. 
 113 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 475.  
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id. at 490. 
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This case turned on the question of whether the city’s plan 
served a public purpose.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
noted that its precedent had defined public purpose broadly, which 
reflected the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments in this field.”
119
  Additionally, the Court reasoned that the 
economic benefits to be derived from development in this case were 
substantially similar to the benefits that flowed from redevelopments 
in Berman and Midkiff.
120
  Justice Stevens indicated that it would be in-
congruous to find that the economic benefits here were of a less a 
public character than the interests in these previous cases, stating that 
“clearly, there [was] no basis for exempting economic development 
from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”
121
  
The Court held that promoting economic development is a tradi-
tional and long-accepted function of government and that the de-
termination of the city’s governing body that the area was “sufficiently 
distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation [was] en-
titled to [the Court’s] deference.”
122
  Justice Stevens examined the re-
development plan and concluded that the plan had to be reviewed as 
a comprehensive whole and not on a piecemeal parcel-by-parcel ba-
sis.
123
  Noting that Kelo’s property was not blighted or distressed, he 
then determined that the taking satisfied the public use requirement 
of the Takings Clause because the plan as a whole “unquestionably 
serve[d] a public purpose.”
124
 
The Court also addressed Kelo’s request that the Court require a 
showing of  “reasonable certainty” that the expected public benefits 
would actually accrue.
125
  Justice Stevens denounced this request as an 
unwarranted departure from precedent.
126
  He declared that this type 
of review was unnecessary because it would be a strain on judicial re-
sources and would ultimately serve as a hindrance to timely comple-
tion of condemnation proceedings: “A constitutional rule that re-
quired postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation 
until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would 
unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful 
 
 119 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
 120 See id. at 485–86.   
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. at 483. 
 123 Id. at 484.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.   
 126 Id.  
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consummation of many such plans.”
127
  If only the Court had fore-
sight; in a cruel twist of fate, just eight years after Pfizer’s arrival, the 
pharmaceutical giant ceased operations in New London and left for 
greener pastures in Groton, Connecticut.
128
  Pfizer abandoned its new 
research facility, located next to a large plot of barren land that was 
cleared to make room for a hotel, condos, and stores that were never 
built.
129
  Kelo and her neighbors lost their homes based on vague 
promises of new jobs and increased tax revenue
130
—promises that 
never came to fruition.
131
 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion stressed that rational basis 
review does not permit a transfer to a private entity when the transfer 
primarily benefits the private party and provides only incidental ben-
efits to the public.
132
  The concurrence attempted to provide some as-
surance to land owners that the Court’s chosen standard of review 
does protect against these unjustified transfers of property.
133
  Justice 
Kennedy, however, also emphasized that the government must be af-
forded a presumption that its actions are reasonable and intended to 
serve a public purpose.
134
  While trying to ensure that courts would 
take pretext claims seriously, Justice Kennedy also reiterated the ma-
jority’s position that courts must give deference to legislative deci-
sions.
135
  After conducting his own review, Justice Kennedy found that 
Pfizer did not motivate the economic redevelopment in New Lon-
don.
136
  Accordingly, New London’s actions survived Justice Kenne-
dy’s “meaningful rational basis review.”
137
  Justice Kennedy acknowl-
edged that the presumption that the government agency acted 
reasonably will not be warranted for economic-redevelopment takings 
in which there is favoritism to private parties.
138
  After Kelo, however, it 
is difficult to think of a situation in which the Court would find that 
the primary purpose of the taking was to favor a private party. 
 
 127 Id. at 488. 
 128 McGeehan, supra note 112.  
 129 Id.  
 130 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 131 See McGeehan, supra note 112. 
 132 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 133 Id. at 493.  
 134 Id. at 491. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 492.  
 137 Id.  
 138 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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Kelo produced two dissenting opinions.
139
  Justice O’Connor ar-
gued that the majority effectively deleted the words “for public use” 
from the Takings Clause.
140
  So long as the local governmental agency 
labels a project “economic development,” all private property is vul-
nerable to a transfer to another private owner, particularly if the new 
private owner uses the land in a way that the agency deems more 
beneficial to the public.
141
  Justice O’Connor called on the courts to 
take control of the definition of “public use,” stating that “an external 
judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, 
however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government power 
is to retain any meaning.”
142
  She recognized the dangerous conse-
quences of the majority’s decision, observing that it permits the gov-
ernment to take private property that is currently put to ordinary pri-
vate use, and then give that same property to another private 
landowner to put it to a different ordinary private use, so long as this 
new use creates an incidental benefit to the public.
143
  Those inciden-
tal benefits could include more jobs, increased tax revenue, or simply 
the creation of more visually appealing property.
144
 
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he 
urged the Court to return to the original meaning of “public pur-
pose.”
145
  Justice Thomas maintained that the original understanding 
of the Takings Clause was a meaningful limit on the government’s 
eminent domain power; however, the Court’s precedent, including 
the majority’s opinion, has construed the public use clause to a “vir-
tual nullity.”
146
  Justice Thomas asserted that the holding permits a de-
termination that an expensive urban-renewal project that vaguely 
promises public benefits, such as the creation of new jobs and in-
creased tax revenue, but is also extraordinarily agreeable to a large 
corporation, qualifies as a constitutional taking.
147
  Additionally, Jus-
tice Thomas commented on the strange treatment of eminent do-
main cases in terms of judicial deference; no other property interest 
determinations receive the same degree of deference to the legisla-
 
 139 Id. at 494–506 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 506–23 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).  
 140 Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 497. 
 143 Id. at 501.  
 144 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501.   
 145 Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id.  
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ture as the public use determinations in the eminent domain con-
text.
148
  As a result, one is safe in his home from government intru-
sion, yet his home itself is not safe from governmental taking.
149
  Fi-
nally, Justice Thomas warned that the effects of the expanded 
definition of “public use” would fall disproportionately on the poor,
150
 
and he agreed with Justice O’Connor that the beneficiaries of such a 
definition would be those with power in the political processes, in-
cluding large corporations and development firms.
151
 
Given the strongly-divided Court, the immediate public backlash 
was not surprising.
152
  Rather than imposing higher standards on gov-
ernments that use eminent domain to transfer land from one private 
owner to another, the majority encouraged state governments that 
disagreed with the decision to take action to restrict their own takings 
powers.
153
  Following the Kelo decision, forty-two states, not including 




B. New York Eminent Domain: Building Empires, Destroying Dreams 
The New York State Constitution’s Takings Clause mirrors that 
of the United States Constitution, and states: “Private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
155
  The State 
Constitution also grants the legislature the power to “provide in such 
manner, by such means and upon such terms and conditions as it 
may prescribe . . . for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary areas.”
156
  Additionally, 
the State Constitution provides that “the legislature may . . . grant the 
power of eminent domain to any . . .  public corporation.”
157
  As a re-
sult, the legislature may vest eminent domain power in public corpo-
rations, such as the Empire State Development Corporation, so long 
 
 148 Id. at  518; see also infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.  
 149 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518; see also infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.  
 150 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521. 
 151 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 241–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 152 John Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2006, A1.  
 153 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
 154 CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62. 
 155 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
 156 N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.  
 157 N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.  
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as it requires that these corporations use eminent domain in appro-
priate instances as determined by the legislature. 
In New York, urban renewal projects had their beginnings in 
“slum clearance,” whereby development projects aimed to remove 
“substandard and insanitary” conditions that threatened the health 
and welfare of the public.
158
  Throughout the twentieth century, 
courts expanded this initial understanding to encompass not only 
slum areas, but also areas that suffered from economic underdeve-
lopment and stagnation.  Courts found that clearing these underde-
veloped areas served a public purpose, even though the areas did not 
technically qualified as “slums.”
159
  New York even began recognizing, 
like the Supreme Court, that the government’s use of eminent do-
main power to transfer private property to a private developer does 
not change the acceptable nature of the taking.
160
  As the dissent 
noted in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp. upon re-
viewing eminent domain case law in New York, the special status that 
New York courts have afforded to blight determinations makes suc-
ceeding on pretext claims—claims that blight is not the true motiva-
tion for the development—especially difficult.
161
 
In 1936, the Court of Appeals of New York gave a more narrow 
interpretation of the Takings Clause than it would in later deci-
sions.
162
  In New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, the New York City 
Housing Authority sought to condemn Andrew Muller’s blighted 
property as part of a slum clearance effort for the stated public use of 
protecting the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.
163
  
The state agency had already acquired the properties on either side 
of Muller’s home and acquisition of his property was necessary for 
the successful completion of the project.
164
  The court recognized 
that, while legislative determinations of public use are not binding on 
the courts, these determinations are entitled to high degree of re-
spect because they relate to public conditions, which the legislature 
 
 158 Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975).   
 159 See Vitucci v. N.Y.C. Sch. Constr. Auth., 735 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) 
(holding that the condemnation of private property to assist commercial develop-
ment that may be economically beneficial to the area, even if the condemned prop-
erties are not blighted, is appropriate); Cannata v. City of N.Y., 182 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 
1962) (holding that condemnation is appropriate to eliminate areas of intangible 
physical blight).  
 160 Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 331. 
 161 921 N.E.2d 164, 187 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).   
 162 See N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).   
 163 Id. at 154.   
 164 Id. at 153.  
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has both the means and the duty to discover.
165
  In comparison to lat-
er decisions,
166
 the court acknowledged that legislative determinations 
of blight are not entitled to complete judicial deference.  In this case, 
the court found that not only did the government allege that the 
proposed redevelopment area was blighted but that it also  proved the 
existence of such conditions.
167
  After finding that the “fundamental 
purpose of government is to protect the health, safety and general 
welfare of the public,”
168
 the court held that the removal of the slum 
to provide low-income housing was indeed a valid public use because 
removal of slums was a “matter of far-reaching public concern,” and 




Importantly, the Muller decision paved the way for future courts 
to find that takings for economic redevelopment serve public uses or 
public purposes.
170
  In dicta, the court stated that a condemning au-
thority is permitted to use eminent domain to promote economic de-
velopment in blighted areas where “there is an equally heavy capital 
loss and a diminishing return in taxes.”
171
  Blighted areas, according 
to the court, strain local economies because of the large amount of 
public funds expended to “maintain health and hospital services for 
afflicted slum dwellers and to war against crime and immorality.”
172
  
While this was not the main holding of the Muller court, it opened 
the door for a more expansive view of economic development and its 
relationship to blighted areas. 
In Kaskel v. Impellitteri, the Court of Appeals of New York stated 
that an entire area, not particular parcels, must be examined in de-
termining whether slum clearance is appropriate because “such sta-
 
 165 Id. at 154.  
 166 See infra notes 173–94 and accompanying text.  
 167 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 154.  
 168 Id. at 155.  Slums, according to the court, “are the breeding places of disease 
which take toll not only from denizens, but, by spread, from the inhabitants of the 
entire city and State. Juvenile delinquency, crime and immorality are there born, 
find protection and flourish.”  Id. at 154.  
 169 Id. at 156.  
 170 See Nichols, supra note 54, at 631.  Nichols argues that during the time of the 
Muller decision, courts in many states, including New York, welcomed the generation 
of general public benefits as a justification for the taking by a private party, id. at 
626–31, thereby abrogating the earlier narrower public use doctrine that demanded 
that “[t]o take property rights from A to transfer to B for B’s private enjoyment is not 
a public use, regardless of what ultimate public purpose the transaction is intended 
to further.” Id.  at 626. 
 171 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 154.   
 172 Id.  
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tutes would not be very useful if limited to areas where every single 
building is substandard.”
173
  This affirmed the Muller court’s decision 
that Muller’s home was properly condemned even if it itself was not 
blighted; however, Kaskel took the concept one step further by affir-
matively stating that many non-blighted buildings may be condemned 
simply due to their unlucky location next to blighted ones.  Again, 
the court deferred to the legislature’s definitions of blight and public 
use; according to the court, the legislature had authorized city offi-
cials to make a determination that an area is unsanitary and 
blighted—a determination that the courts could not overhaul.
174
  Be-
cause the legislature had determined that slum and blight clearance 
constituted a public use, the government officials were authorized to 
condemn the land.
175
  Interestingly, less than two decades after Muller, 
the court firmly established that courts must afford the legislature 
complete deference in findings of blight, making it nearly impossible 
for those findings to be overturned. 
The following decades found New York courts embracing a 
more flexible definition of “blight” which, according to court in Yonk-
ers Community Development Agency v. Morris, consisted of a multitude of 
malleable factors that governmental agencies could mold to fit their 
needs.
176
  The appellate court held in Cannata v. City of New York that 
physical, tangible blight is not even necessary to find a “public pur-
pose” for slum clearance.
177
  The court held that condemnation can 
 
 173 115 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1953).  
 174 Id.  
 175 Id.  
 176 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975).  The Morris court identified the following as a 
definition of blight “universally indorsed [sic] by case law.” Id. at 332. 
Many factors and interrelationships of factors may be significant. These 
may include such diverse matters as irregularity of the plots, inadequa-
cy of the streets, diversity of land ownership making assemblage of 
property difficult, incompatibility of the existing mixture of residential 
and industrial property, overcrowding, the incidence of crime, lack of 
sanitation, the drain an area makes on municipal services, fire hazards, 
traffic congestion, and pollution.  It can encompass areas in the 
process of deterioration or threatened with it as well as ones already 
rendered useless, prevention being an important use.  It is “something 
more than deteriorated structures.  It involves improper land use.  
Therefore, its causes, originating many years ago, include not only 
outmoded and deteriorated structures, but unwise planning and zon-
ing, poor regulatory code provisions, and inadequate provisions for the 
flow of traffic.”  
Id. at 332 (quoting John F. Cook, Battle Against Blight, 43 MARQUETTE L. REV. 444, 445 
(1960)). 
 177 Cannata v. City of New York, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961), aff’d, 
182 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 1962).  
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be authorized not only for slum clearance but also to eliminate areas 
of “intangible” physical blight, which refers to areas that tend to 
create blight or hinder the productive development of a city.
178
  Ra-
ther than reining in the power of the legislature to condemn private 
property, the court greatly expanded the government’s authority to 
employ its takings power.
179
  Relying on decisions from other states, 
the court expanded its definitions of “blight” and “public purpose” by 
stating that “redevelopment may properly be accomplished by private 
persons; and the area condemned may thereafter be properly used 
for nonresidential purposes.”
180
  This decision is troubling because it 
marks the moment when the interpretation of “public use” started 
permitting the transfer of private property to another private entity if 




While the Cannata holding seemed to establish that under New 
York’s eminent domain jurisprudence the eminent domain powers of 
the government had almost no boundaries, the Morris decision, on its 
face, appeared to rein in these powers.
182
  The court, however, made 
clear that its Morris holding was not a true limit on the government’s 
eminent domain power.
183
  The Morris court reiterated that New York 
courts do not merely rubber stamp a determination of substandard 
conditions in the urban renewal context; rather, the courts must in-
dependently determine the existence of a true public purpose and 
substantiate that determination.
184
  While at first blush this appears to 
restrain eminent domain power in New York, the court reasoned that 
the holding was in line with other New York eminent domain deci-
sions, notably Kaskel.
185
  Accordingly, the court determined that the 
government agency presented sufficient evidence to show that the 
area to be condemned was indeed substandard.
186
  The Morris court 
explained that even when the stated public purpose of a project is the 
removal of blight, and even though government agencies have wide 
discretion in determining what constitutes blight, facts supporting 
 
 178 Id.  
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 189 (N.Y. 2009) 
(Smith, J., dissenting).  
 182 See Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 333.  
 183 Id. at 334.  
 184 Id. at 333.  
 185 Id. (citing Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1953)). 
 186 Id.  
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the determination need to be adequately documented.
187
  Again, even 
though this appears to be a heightened standard, the court quickly 
noted that meeting such a standard, in the majority of cases, is easy.
188
 
Modern New York decisions are continuing the tradition of ever-
expanding definitions of public use and blight.
189
  In Vitucci v. New 
York City School Construction Authority, the appellate court acknowl-
edged that the term “public use” is to be broadly interpreted to in-
clude “virtually any project that may further the public benefit, utility, 
or advantage.”
190
  The court also authorized the condemnation of pri-
vate property to assist commercial development that may be economi-
cally beneficial to the area, even if the condemnation may benefit a 
private commercial entity.
191
  Remarkably, the court found that if the 
government “determines that a new business may create jobs, provide 
infrastructure, and stimulate the local economy, those are legitimate 
public purposes which justify the use of the power of eminent do-
main.”
192
  With such a holding, the court’s deference to the legislature 
paved a very clear path for the taking in Kaur. 
In Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., the most re-
cent New York eminent domain decision prior to Kaur, the court 
completely removed any judicial check on the government’s eminent 
domain power.
193
  The Goldstein court held that where there is a rea-
sonable difference in opinion as to whether the area in question is in 




V. PROBLEMS WITH LIMITLESS PUBLIC USE 
There are numerous problems with both the United States Su-
preme Court’s and the New York state courts’ interpretations of pub-
lic use.  The expansive definitions of public use give the government 
 
 187 Id. at 332.  
 188 Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 332.   
 189 See infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 190 735 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).  
 191 Id.   
 192 Id; see also Byrne v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres., 476 
N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that “public use” constitutes any use 
which contributes to the health, safety, general welfare, convenience, or prosperity of 
the community).  The Byrne court found that the construction of a safe boat refuge at 
Port Ontario served a valid public use because it was not only vital to the safety of 
boaters but also because the “influx of Federal funds for the project would have a pos-
itive impact on the economy.”  Id. at 43 (emphasis added).     
 193 Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 173 (N.Y. 2009). 
 194 Id.  
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power to essentially take non-blighted land and the home of a private 
party and transfer it into the hands of another private party for the 
purposes of economic redevelopment.
195
  It appears that the phrase 
“economic redevelopment” has magical powers when in the courts’ 
hands because it invites the courts to look at the entire scope of the 
plan, rather than at the stated individual goals of the plan.  In these 
situations, it would be especially difficult not to find an underlying 
public purpose.  Rationally, almost any economic redevelopment 
project that vaguely promises better parks, more jobs, and increased 
tax revenue to the neighborhood— in addition to expanding a large, 
private university—would seem to serve a public purpose.  Even if the 
particular parcel itself is not blighted, the taking of the parcel to faci-
litate community-wide redevelopment now clearly serves a greater 
public purpose under the broad interpretation of public use.
196
  Judge 
Posner posed the following question that gets to the heart of the 
problem: 
If “economic rejuvenation” is a public use, what is to prevent a city 
from condemning the homes of lower-middle-class families and 
giving them free of charge to multimillionaires, provided it could 
show that the new owners would be likely to pay enough for vari-
ous local goods and services, and in property and other local tax-
es, to offset the expense of compensating the owners of the con-
demned properties at market value?
197
 
Judge Posner’s insightful question demonstrates the dangers of such 
a broad definition of public purpose. 
The public purpose test opens the door to Takings Clause abuse 
by the government.  Some Justices, like Justice Thomas, believe that 
the public use definition has gone too far from its original meaning, 
which required that the public actually and as a whole “employ” the 
property.
198
  As Justice Thomas asserted in his Kelo dissent, despite in-
cidental benefits to the public from private use, it is disingenuous to 
assert that the public is employing the property that the government 
has awarded to a private individual.
199
  Incidental benefits to the pub-
lic are critical elements of eminent domain jurisprudence; according-
ly, much Takings Clause litigation involves claims that the benefits of 
 
 195 Zeiner, supra note 45, at 9. 
 196 See, e.g., Vitucci v. N.Y.C. Sch. Constr. Auth., 735 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2001). 
 197 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Forward: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 93 (2005). 
 198 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 508–09 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).  
 199 Id.  
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the taking are not truly for a public purpose, but rather confer a pri-
vate benefit with only incidental public benefits.
200
  Economic redeve-
lopment cases, such as the Kaur case, serve as a prime example of 
such pretext challenges. 
Courts in the state of New York adhere to a self-titled “public 
use” test, and some judges claim that they have not adopted the 
broader public purpose test endorsed by the United States Supreme 
Court.
201
  Although this statement may look neat and tidy on paper, 
modern decisions in New York have shown acceptance of a much 
broader definition of “public use” than perhaps Judge Smith,  who 
dissented in Goldstein, is willing to admit.  Older decisions, like Muller, 
may not have been narrow in their interpretation of “public use,”
202
 
but at the very least those courts required that “slum clearance” serve 
a valid public use by protecting the health, safety, and general welfare 
of the public.
203
  The Kaur court determined that the “physical, eco-
nomic, engineering and environmental conditions at the Project site” 
served as a valid finding of blight, thus creating a basis for the tak-
ing.
204
  This demonstrates the court’s departure from the Muller deci-
sion and the adoption of a more malleable definition of blight that 
includes other factors, including intangible conditions like economic 
depression.
205
  As a result, the Kaur decision reaffirmed that economic 
underdevelopment can serve as a valid basis for taking private prop-
erty because such economic conditions satisfy a finding of blight. 
 
 200 See, e.g., Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).  
 201 See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 186 (N.Y. 2009) 
(Smith, J. dissenting).  
The good news from today’s decision is that our Court has not followed 
the lead of the United States Supreme Court in rendering the ‘public 
use’ restriction on the Eminent Domain Clause virtually meaningless.  
The bad news is that the majority is much too deferential to the self-
serving determination by the Empire State Development Corporation 
(ESDC) that petitioners live in a ‘blighted’ area, and are accordingly 
subject to having their homes seized and turned over to a private de-
veloper.  
Id. 
 202 Compare N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that 
slum clearance was a valid public use because it protects the health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare of the public), with In re Niagara Falls v. Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429 
(N.Y. 1888) (taking of private property for construction of a privately run sightseeing 
railroad was not a public use), and In re Deansville Cemetary Assn., 66 N.Y. 569 
(1876) (taking of private land for construction of a cemetery is not a public use), and 
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (Sup. Ct. 1843) (taking of land for a private road not al-
lowed).  
 203 Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 155.   
 204 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 731 (emphasis added).  
 205 Id. 
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VI.  COURTS MUST PROTECT AMERICANS FROM EMINENT DOMAIN 
ABUSE BY PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE 
A. Columbia University’s Bite out of the Big Apple 
The plaintiffs in Kaur raised several challenges to the taking of 
their property.
206
  Namely, the plaintiffs claimed that there was no 
true public purpose for the taking and that the project contemplated 
primarily benefiting a private party, Columbia University.
207
  It should 
be noted at the outset that, unlike Kelo, in which the city planned the 
redevelopment of the waterfront area before Pfizer claimed an inter-
est,
208
 Columbia University approached the EDC to redevelop the 
West Harlem area.
209
  This should have been a big “red flag” to any 
court considering a pre-text challenge. 
In the Kaur case, the ESDC set forth many public purposes.  The 
first public purpose that the ESDC proposed addressed the city’s and 
statewide “need for education, community, recreational, cultural and 
other civic facilities.”
210
  The ESDC asserted that the project would 
enable the city and the state to maintain their positions as global cen-
ters for higher education and research.
211
  Second, the ESDC claimed 
that the project would create 14,000 jobs during the construction 
phase and 6,000 permanent jobs once the project was completed.
212
  
Third, the ESDC stated that the project would create “substantial” 
revenue, with an estimated $122 million in revenue for the state and 
$87 million for the city.
213
  Fourth, the ESDC indicated that another 
purpose of the project was to create 94,000 square feet of “much 
needed public space” that would be maintained in perpetuity.
214
  This 
space would be punctuated by trees, open vistas, paths, landscaping 
and street furniture, and an additional 28,000 square feet of widened 
sidewalks that would invite east-west pedestrian traffic.
215
  Additionally, 
the project would make necessary infrastructure improvements to the 
125th street subway station in addition to the creation and mainten-
 
 206 Id. at 730.  
 207 Id. 
 208 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).  
 209 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 725.  
 210 Id. at 729. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id.  
 213 Id.  
 214 Id.  
 215 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729.   
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ance of the West Harlem Piers Park.
216
  Finally, Columbia would pro-
vide rent-free land for forty-nine years to a new public school whose 
students would have access to Columbia’s libraries and computer 
centers.
217
  The new swimming facilities would also be open to the 
public at large.
218
  After examining all of the amenities that the private 
university and the ESDC claimed would flow from the creation of the 
new campus, it appears that the only aspect of the project that is truly 
open for public use is the “desperately needed” public space and the 
new swimming pool. 
It is on these grounds that the plaintiffs claimed that the stated 
public purposes were mere “pretext,” which concealed the grant of a 
huge benefit to a private entity.
219
  The Court of Appeals of New York, 
following the footsteps of the New York courts and the Supreme 
Court, gave heavy deference to the New York State Legislature.
220
  The 
Kaur court stated that “because the determinations of blight and pub-
lic purpose are the province of the Legislature, [they] are entitled to 
deference by the Judiciary”
221
  The court further explained its defe-
rence to the legislature by referencing its Goldstein decision regarding 
the Atlantic Yards; there, the court clarified that judges may substi-
tute their views as to whether the government has properly deter-
mined that an area is blighted only when there is no room for rea-
sonable differences of opinion.
222
  The court noted that the New York 
Constitution grants the legislature broad power to take and clear 
substandard and unsanitary areas for redevelopment, and simulta-
neously deprives the judiciary of the power to interfere with such an 
exercise of legislative authority.
223
 
Because the Kaur court could only apply a rational basis review 
to the plaintiff’s pretext claims, it is not surprising that the court 
found that the blight determination and the taking were not irration-
al or baseless.
224
  For a New York governmental organization to invoke 
its eminent domain power and condemn an area as a land use im-
 
 216 Id.    
 217 Id.  
 218 Id.  
 219 Id. at 731–32.  
 220 Id. at 730–31.  
 221 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 730.  
 222 Id. (citing Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 
2009)).  
 223 Id. (citing Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 173).   
 224 See id. at 731.  
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provement project, the Urban Development Corporation Act pro-
vides that the area must meet the following requirements: 
That the area in which the project is to be located is a subs-
tandard or insanitary area, or is in danger of becoming a substan-
dard or insanitary area and tends to impair and arrest the sound 
growth and development of the municipality; 
That the project consists of a plan or undertaking for the 
clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of such 
area and for recreational and other facilities incidental or appur-
tenant thereto; and 
That the plan or undertaking affords maximum opportunity 
for participation by private enterprise, consistent with the sound 
needs of the municipality as a whole.225 
These broad requirements for condemnation would allow most 
neighborhoods in New York City to qualify for condemnation under 
land use improvement projects.  If the legislature does not have an 
interest in protecting its citizens from eminent domain abuse,
226
 then 
the courts must step in to place a check on the power of the legisla-
ture. 
B. Courts Need to Require More than Vague Promises of Public Benefits 
While most states took the initiative to protect their citizens’ 
property rights in the aftermath of Kelo, New York continued to be, 
and still is, among the leaders in eminent domain abuse.
227
  There is 
no serious momentum towards comprehensive legislative reform in 
New York.
228
  Accordingly, the legislature willingly permits the gov-
ernment to take property of homeowners and businesses for private 
gain.
229
  Furthermore, in what appears to be an odd reality of eminent 
domain jurisprudence, courts heavily defer to legislative conclusions 
 
 225 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6260(c)(1)–(3) (McKinney 2010).  
 226 CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62.  
 227 Id.; see also Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Coping with Kelo: A Potpourri of 
Legislative and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 799, 850 (2008) 
(“[R]ural states, and other tending toward deference toward private property rights, 
have been the most active in forbidding condemnation practices that, for the most 
part, their subdivisions did not engage in anyway.  Those states, largely in the north-
east, which have engaged in extensive condemnation activity for private revitaliza-
tion, largely have resisted change.”).  
 228 CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62.  As of November 2011, New York has not 
enacted any laws that protect against eminent domain abuse.  However, New York 
State Senator Bill Perkins, whose district encompasses Columbia University and the 
project area, introduced a bill in 2010 that proposed to give “blight” a firm definition 
in order to curb the government’s takings power.  S. 6791, 2010 Leg., 232nd Leg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2010).  
 229 CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62.  
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about what serves a public purpose.
230
  As noted by Justice Thomas in 
his Kelo dissent, courts do not so heavily rely on legislative determina-
tions in most other areas of the law.
231
  Justice Thomas pointed to the 
Court’s careful assessments of the reasonableness of a search of a 
home and the shackling of a defendant during sentencing proceed-
ings as examples.
232
  As a consequence of such legislative deference in 
eminent domain cases, Justice Thomas finds a paradox in the Court’s 
jurisprudence relating to the home: 
[There is] overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has 
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Repub-
lic, when the issue is only whether the government may search a 
home.  Yet . . . the Court tells us that we are not to “‘second-guess 
the City’s considered judgments”‘ when the issue is, instead, 
whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive 
step of tearing down petitioners’ homes.233 
Essentially, people are free from government intrusion inside their 
home, but their homes themselves are not protected from the gov-
ernment’s ability to tear them down.
234
  Continuing down the path of 
broadening the power of the Takings Clause will lead to dangerous 
consequences, as demonstrated by the Kaur decision.  The public 
purpose test is far too expansive to have any true meaning because so 
many economic development projects satisfy the minimal require-
ments of the test.  As a result, such projects would be permitted to 
proceed regardless of the true private-benefit nature of the taking.  
Furthermore, the public use limitation serves an important role by 
requiring that an independent, outside observer make the determi-
nation as to whether there is actual use by the public.
235
  To let the 
government agency itself determine what is public use makes the 
agency simultaneously a judge of and an advocate for its own cause.
236
  
Courts need to require that local governments demonstrate with 
“reasonable certainty” that the taking of the private property would 
bring forth the excepted public benefit. 
 
 230 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 517 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see discussion supra Part IV.  
 231 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).    
 232 Id. at 518.   
 233 Id. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Payton v. N.Y., 455 U.S. 573, 601 
(1980).   
 234 Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 235 Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009) 
(Smith, J., dissenting).  
 236 Id.  
MCGLYNN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  9:51 AM 
452 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:423 
Supporters of judicial deference to legislatures argue that there 
are many benefits to such deference.  Justice Stevens, in a speech de-
fending the Kelo decision, noted that the “public outcry that greeted 
Kelo is some evidence that the political process is up to the task of ad-
dressing” the issues surrounding eminent domain.
237
  In theory, the 
legislative and constitutional amendment processes are highly res-
ponsive and equipped to evaluate and consider competing public in-
terests.
238
  While the Court has brought about sweeping change in a 
number of areas,
239
 generally, the methodology of constitutional in-




At the same time, however, the legislature can be largely influ-
enced by public interest groups,
241
 leaving some citizens out in the 
cold without any influence on their local government.
242
  Justice 
O’Connor observed in Kelo that citizens with disproportionate influ-
ence and power in the political process, including large corporations 
and development firms, would benefit.
243
  As noted by scholars, those 
groups of people who are primarily targets of urban renewal pro-
grams are racial minorities, who do not have the same political sway 
as their wealthy, white neighbors.
244
  Historically, especially following 
the Berman decision, racial motivations were often hidden behind the 
labels of “slum clearance” or “neighborhood revitalization,” but a 
primary goal of these urban renewal projects was to channel minority 
settlement into certain areas and to uproot minority communities in 
other areas.
245
  The West Harlem neighborhood in which Columbia 
has staked its flag is primarily a minority community.  Often times, 
the goals of redevelopment initiatives receive wide praise; meanwhile 
 
 237 The Honorable John Paul Stevens, Assoc. J., Supreme C. of the U.S., Judicial 
Predilections, Address to the Clark County Bar Association (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV. 
L.J. 1,4 (2005). 
 238 Mahoney, supra note 101, at 125.  
 239 Id.  Mahoney notes that the Court was able to bring huge transformation in 
contracts, commerce, and due process clause doctrine, particularly in the New Deal 
era.  Id. at 126.  
 240 Id. at 126.  Mahoney suggests that it is reasonable to look to statutes and consti-
tutional amendments for more effective, permanent relief from eminent domain 
abuse. Id. 
 241 Id. at 125.  
 242 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing).  
 243 Id.  
 244 Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2003).  
 245 Id. at 47.    
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in the poor areas to be redeveloped, neighbors struggle to build 
community in the midst of abandonment.
246
  It is a powerful reminder 
that blight, while sometimes obvious, remains in the eye of the be-
holder.
247
  As New York has failed to take any measurable steps to-
wards protecting its citizens’ homes and businesses, those who live 
within the boundaries of West Harlem are facing an incalculable 
harm and suffering to their businesses, homes and community.  The 
near-total-deference standard protects only against the most obvious 




As an alternative to legislative deference, courts should demand 
from local governmental organizations a showing of “reasonable cer-
tainty” that the expected benefits from an economic redevelopment 
project will actually accrue.  Opponents to this proposition have 
stated that requiring judicial approval of every condemnation until 
the likelihood of success of the plan has been sufficiently established 
would impose a significant obstacle to the successful consummation 
of many plans.
249
  However precious and valuable time is to the suc-
cessful consummation of plans, the actual success of the proposed 
redevelopment project, not just the rapidity at which the plan can be 
implemented, should be equally important.  Suzette Kelo and her 
neighbors would have stood a fighting chance of keeping their 
homes if the court had required the city to show more than mere 
promises of more jobs and increased tax revenue.
250
  Instead, in the 
place of their former beloved homes there are empty lots of land be-
cause the economic development project never came to fruition, pre-
sumably never delivering on those promises of increased jobs and 
other benefits.
251
  If all that is required for a redevelopment plan to 
pass muster is a general statement of intended benefits to the public, 
then any economic redevelopment plan would pass the test.  This is 
dangerous and injurious to neighborhoods all over the United States, 
particularly in regions, like New York, where there are no legislative 
initiatives to limit eminent domain power. 
While many plans would likely prove to be successful under the 
current standard—meaning that individuals would lose their homes, 
businesses, and community—extended judicial review would ensure 
 
 246 Id. at 51–52.  
 247 Id. 
 248 Mahoney, supra note 101, at 131.  
 249 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005).  
 250 See id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 251 McGeehan, supra note 112.   
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that this loss would, at a minimum, advance a true public purpose.  In 
the Kaur case, it is possible that the proposed plan would not pass this 
heightened scrutiny.  The redevelopment plan, like the plan in Kelo, 
lists broad estimations of new jobs and increased tax revenue.  The 
plan, however, lacks specificity.  The types of jobs to be created and 
an explanation of how the public at large would benefit from imple-
mentation of the project are conspicuously absent.  At the same time, 
however, Columbia University is an established, stable institution.  In 
contrast to Pfizer, Columbia is unlikely to “pull-out” of the neighbor-
hood because of the proximity of the main campus and the apparent 
need to expand the school and its resources. 
While this Comment cannot resolve this issue, it is one that de-
serves the Courts’ careful consideration.  Requiring Columbia and 
the redevelopment team to show credible evidence that the stated 
public benefits would accrue would not unduly burden the affluent 
institution.  The homes and businesses of the Singhs, Sprayregen, 
and their neighbors deserve the same fundamental judicial protec-
tions and checks that their other property interests receive. 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain is a powerful land development tool that, when 
used appropriately, can have positive effects on communities.  At the 
same time, eminent domain can be a dangerous weapon when it falls 
into the hands of private parties who use eminent domain as a way to 
advance their private agenda.  The Kaur decision demonstrates just 
how powerful private interests can be and is a clear example of the 
need for additional judicial protection against this strong force.  The 
current extreme judicial deference to legislatures provides only mi-
nimal protection against radical uses of eminent domain.  Courts can 
only overturn a governmental finding of blight if it is not rationally 
related to the project.  As a result, as long as the economic redeve-
lopment projects list certain public benefits, such as new jobs and in-
creased tax revenue, they would likely pass judicial review as constitu-
tional exercises of the Takings Clause. 
Courts must have a stronger, more active role in eminent do-
main challenges, particularly in those challenges in which the plain-
tiffs claim that the stated public purpose are merely pretexts for con-
ferring benefits on private entities.  To accomplish this, courts need 
to demand that local governments show a “reasonable certainty” that 
the stated public benefits would flow from the project.  While this 
heightened review is not perfect—as projects with truly pretextual 
stated public benefits would fall through the cracks—it would at least 
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assure home and business owners that the government will not take 
their property without a second check by the courts. 
 
